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The probability of a property on the collection of all finite relational structures 
is the limit as n + co of the fraction of structures with n elements satisfying the 
property, provided the limit exists. It is known that a 01 law holds for any 
property expressible in first-order logic; i.e., the probability of any such property 
exists and is either 0 or 1. Moreover, the associated decision problem for the 
probabilities in PSPACE-complete We investigate here fragments of existential 
second-order logic in which we restric the patterns of first-order quantifiers. We 
focus on the class ,Z: (Ackermann) of existential second-order sentences in which 
the first-order part belongs to the Ackermann class; i.e., it contains at most one 
universal first-order quantifier. All properties expressible by Z: (Ackermann) 
sentences are NP-computable and there are natural NP-complete properties, such 
as SATISFIABILITY, that are expressible by such sentences. We establish that the 
01 law holds for the class Xi (Ackermann) and identify the complexity of the 
associated decision problem. We also show that the 01 law fails for other 
fragments of existential second-order logic in which the first-order part belongs to 
certain prefix classes with an unsolvable decision problem. Thus, the emerging 
picture is that the classifications of prefix classes according to the solvability of the 
satistiability problem and according to the O-1 law for the corresponding Ci 
fragment are identical. i;l 1990 Academic Press. Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years a considerable amount of research activity has been 
devoted to the study of the model theory of finite structures. This theory 
* A preliminary version of this paper appeared in “Proceedings 3rd IEEE Symposium on 
Logic in Computer Science,” July 1988, pp. 2-l 1. 
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has interesting applications to several other areas including database 
theory (Chandra and Harel, 1982; Vardi, 1982) and complexity theory 
(Ajtai, 1983; Gurevich, 1984; Immerman, 1983, 1986). One particular 
direction of research has focused on the asymptotic probabilities of properties 
expressible in different languages and the associated decision problem for 
the values of the probabilities. 
In general, if C is a class of finite structures over some vocabulary and 
if P is a property of some structures in C, then the asymptotic probability 
p(P) on C is the limit as n + cc of the fraction of the structures in C with 
n elements which satisfy P, provided that the limit exists. We say that P is 
almost surely true on C in case p(P) is equal to 1. Combinatorialists have 
studied extensively the asymptotic probabilities of interesting properties on 
the class G of all finite graphs. It is, for example, well known and easy 
to prove that p(connectivity) = 1, while p(l-colorability) = 0, for any 1 
(Bollobas, 1985). A theorem of Posa ( 1976) asserts that p( Hamiltonicity ) = 1. 
Glebskii et al. (1969) and independently Fagin (1976) were the first to 
establish a fascinating connection between logical definability and 
asymptotic probabilities. More specifically, they showed that if C is the 
class of all finite structures over some relational vocabulary and if P is any 
property expressible in first-order logic, then p(P) exists and is either 0 or 
1. This result is known as the &l law for first-order logic. The proof of the 
0-l law also implies that the decision problem for the value of the 
probabilities of first-order sentences is solvable. Grandjean (1983) showed 
that the complexity of this problem is PSPACE-complete for bounded’ 
underlying vocabularies. These results about almost sure truth are in sharp 
contrast Trakhtenbrot’s (1950) classical theorem to the effect that the set of 
first-order sentences which are true on all finite relational structures is 
unsolvable, assuming that the vocabulary contains at least one binary 
relation symbol. 
It is well known that first-order logic has very limited expressive 
power on finite structures (cf. (Aho and Ullman, 1979)). For this reason, 
researchers have investigated asymptotic probabilities in logical languages 
that go beyond first-order. Two possible directions in this investigation are 
infinitary logic and second-order logic. Asymptotic probabilities of senten- 
ces expressible in various infinitary logics have been investigated in (Blass 
et al., 1985; Kolaitis and Vardi, 1987, 1990) and the boundary of 0-l laws 
for infinitary logics is now well understood. In the direction of second- 
order logic, Kaufmann and Shelah (1985) studied asymptotic probabilities 
of properties expressible in monadic second-order logic and found that the 
&l law fails in a strong way for this logic. Kaufmann (1987) later showed 
’ A vocabulary is hounded if there is an a priori bound on the arities of the predicates in 
the vocabulary. 
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that this failure extends also to the existential fragment of monadic second- 
order logic. In addition, it is not hard to show that the set of almost surely 
true existential monadic second-order sentences is unsolvable. In view of 
this result it is natural to ask: are there fragments of second-order logic for 
which a &I law holds? 
The simplest and most natural fragments of second-order logic are 
formed by considering second-order sentences with only existential second- 
order quantifiers or with only universal second-order quantitiers. These are 
the well known classes of Zi and Z7: sentences, respectively. Fagin (1974) 
proved that a property is C: definable if and only if it is NP-computable. 
The O-1 law, however, fails for C: in general (and consequently for ni as 
well), since, for example, parity is definable by a Ci sentence. Moreover, as 
mentioned earlier, it is not hard to show that the Xi sentences having 
probability 1 form an unsolvable set. 
In view of these facts, we concentrate on fragments of C: sentences in 
which we restrict the pattern of the first-order quantifiers that occur in the 
sentence. If Y is a class of first-order sentences, then we denote by Cf( Y) 
the class of C: sentences where the first-order part is in Y. Two remarks 
are in order now. First, if Y is the class of all 3*V*3* first-order sentences 
(that is to say, first-order sentences whose quantifier prefix consists of a 
string of existential quantifiers, followed by a string of universal quantifiers, 
followed by a string of existential quantifiers), then C:(Y) has the same 
expressive power as the full Zi. In other words, every Et formula is 
equivalent to one of the form 
3S3xVy3zO(S, x, y, z), 
where 8 is a quantifier-free formula, S is a sequence of second-order 
relation variables, and x, y, z are sequences of first-order variables (Sk&m 
normal form). Second, if q(S) is a first-order sentence without equality over 
the vocabulary S, then #!$(S)) = 1 if and only if q(S) is finitely 
satisfiable. Thus, for any first-order class Y the decision problem for C:(Y) 
sentences having probability 1 is at least as hard as the finite satistiability 
problem for sentences in Y. The latter problem is known to be unsolvable 
(Trakhtenbrot, 1950), even in the case where Y is the class of 3*V*3* 
sentences (cf. (Lewis, 1979)). As a result, in order to pursue positive 
solvability results one has to consider fragments Z:(Y), where Y is a class 
for which the finite satisfiability problem is solvable. 
There are exactly three solvable prefix classes, i.e., classes of first-order 
sentences defined by their quantifier prefix (Dreben and Goldfarb, 1979): 
. The Bernays-Schiinfiinkel class, which is the collection of all 
first-order sentences with prefixes of the form 3*V* (i.e., the existential 
quantifiers precede the universal quantifiers). 
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. The Ackermann class, which is the collection of all first-order 
sentences with prefixes of the form 3*V3* (i.e., the prefix contains a single 
universal quantifier). 
. The Giidel class without equality, which is the collection of all Iirst- 
order sentences with prefixes of the form 3*VV3* (i.e., the prefix contains 
two consecutive universal quantifiers) and without equality (the Godel class 
with equality is unsolvable (Goldfarb, 1984)). 
In (Kolaitis and Vardi, 1987) we raised the question of whether the O-1 
law holds for the C: fragments defined by these classes, and whether or not 
the associated decision problem for the probabilities is solvable. We began 
the investigation by focusing on the class C:(3*V*) of existential second- 
order sentences with a Bernays-Schonlinkel first-order part. The sentences 
in this class, which we called strict C:, not only can express graph-theoretic 
properties such as disconnectivity, but can also capture natural NP-com- 
plete problems, such as l-colorability for any I, monochromatic triangle, 
and others. In (Kolaitis and Vardi, 1987) we proved that the t&l law holds 
for C:(l*V*), and that the decision problem for the values of the 
probabilities is solvable. Moreover, this decision problem is NEXPTIME- 
complete for bounded vocabularies and 2NEXPTIME-complete for 
unbounded vocabularies. 
In this paper we concentrate on the class ,Z: (Ackermann) of C:(3*V3*) 
second-order sentences. We show that this class can capture natural 
NP-complete properties, such as satisfiability. After this, we establish that 
the O-1 law holds for this class, and that the decision problem for the 
values of the probabilities is solvable. We identify the complexity of the 
decision problem as EXPTIME-complete for L’: (Ackermann) sentences 
without equality, NEXPTIME-complete for L’: (Ackermann) sentences with 
equality over bounded vocabularies, and L’“;P-complete2 for Ci (Acker- 
mann) sentences with equality over unbounded vocabularies. To obtain the 
&l law and the upper bounds for the decision problem, we combine tools 
developed in (Godel, 1932) and (Gurevich and Shelah, 1983) (to show the 
solvability of the Gijdel class without equality) with asymptotic estimates 
from probability theory (Chernoff, 1952). (We note, however, that these 
tools do not appear to be powerful enough to settle the O-1 law for the 2: 
(Godel) class of C:(3*VV3*) sentences.) 
We also obtain negative results for certain fragments of ,L’; that 
correspond to prefix classes with an unsolvable satisfiability problem. 
* ,?IyP is the second level of the exponential hierarchy. It can be described as the class of 
languages accepted by alternating exponential-time Turing machines in two alternations 
where the machine start state is existential or as the class NEXPNP of languages accepted by 
nondeterministic exponential-time Turing machines with oracles from NP (Hartmanis er al., 
1985). 
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Specifically, we consider the classes 2’i(V33) and C:(ElV) and show that 
the O-1 law fails for both of them. Thus, the emerging picture is that the 
classifications of prefix classes according to the solvability of the 
satisfiability problem and according to the O-1 law for the corresponding 
C: fragment are identical. Moreover, &l laws in this classification are 
always accompanied by solvability of the decision problem for the 
probabilities. We will return to discuss this picture at the conclusion of the 
paper. 
2. THE EXPRESSIVE POWER OF 2’; (ACKERMANN) 
In this section we show that the class z; (Ackermann) can capture 
natural NP-complete properties, and that it is not less expressive than the 
class C: (Bernays-Schonlinkel) (we conjecture that these two classes are of 
incomparable expressive power). 
In what follows, boldface letters R, S, etc., range over sequences of rela- 
tional symbols. We fix such a finite sequence R and call it the underlying 
vocabulary. A Ci (Ackermanp) sentence over R is an expression of the form 
where cp is a quantifier-free formula with relational variables in R u S. 
The most well known example of an NP-complete problem is 
SATISFIABILITY : 
l Given a set V of variables and a collection C of clauses over V, is 
there a satisfying truth assignment for C? 
Consider now a vocabulary R consisting of a unary relation symbol V, 
and two binary relation symbol P and N. With every instance I of 
SATISFIABILITY, we associate a structure D(Z) over R by taking the 
universe of D(Z) to be the union Vu C of the set of variables and the set 
of clauses, using the unary relation V to code the variables, and using the 
relations P and N to code the positive and the negative occurrences, 
respectively, of the variables in the clauses (i.e., P(c, v) means that the 
variable v occurs positively in the clause c, and analogously for N). This 
encoding of SATISFIABILITY appeared first in (Dalhlaus, 1984). 
Let Y be the C: (Ackermann) sentence over R 
(~V’)O’YWZ)(CY~ VI -+ C(~‘(Y,Z) A 2~ V’) v (NY, z) A 24 VI), 
where V’ is a unary relation variable. It is not hard to see that there is a 
satisfying assignment for Z if and only if D(Z) /= Y. Thus, y is a zi (Acker- 
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mann) sentence that encodes SATISFIABILITY as a class of structures in 
a natural way. 
It is perhaps worth pointing out that Y is a minimal C: (Ackermann) 
sentence, since there is only one existential second-order quantifier (which, 
moreover, is monadic), the first-order part has the minimal V3 Ackermann 
prefix that is not a BernayssSchXmkel prefix, and the quantifer-free part is 
without equalities. 
Another NP-complete property that can be expressed by a ,X! (Acker- 
mann) sentence is SET SPLITTING (problem [SP4] in (Garey and 
Johnson, 1979)) : 
l Given a collection C of subsets of a finite set S, is there a partition 
of S into two subsets Si and S2 such that no subset of S in C is entirely 
contained in either S, or S,? 
Consider now a vocabulary R consisting of a unary relation symbol S 
and a binary relation symbol M. With every instance I of SET SPLIT- 
TING, we associate a structure D(Z) over R by taking the universe of D(Z) 
to be the union Su C of the set of elements and the set of subsets, using 
the relation S to code the elements and using the relation M to code mem- 
bership (i.e., M(s, e) means that the element e belongs to the set s). 
Let Y be the z: (Ackermann) sentence over R 
where S’ is a unary relation variable. It is not hard to see that there is a 
set splitting for I if and only if D(Z) + Y. Thus, Y is a Cl (Ackermann) 
sentence that encodes SET SPLITTING as a class of structures in a 
natural way. Note that the first-order quantifier prefix of Y is of the form 
ml. 
For a property of different flavor, consider CYCLICITY, i.e., the collec- 
tion of all finite graphs G = (V, E) that contain a cycle as a subgraph. It is 
well known (cf. (Beeri et al., 1987)) that this property is nor first-order 
expressible. We show next that CYCLICITY is expressible by a ci (Acker- 
mann) sentence. 
Let cp( y, S) be the first-order formula 
CP)(m, Y) -+ S(z))1 + S(Y), 
where S is a unary relation variable. Intuitively, q asserts that if all the 
predecessors of y are in S, then so is y. Let $(S) be the first-order sentence 
Intuitively, II/ asserts that S is “closed” in the sense that it contains a node 
whenever it contains all the predecessors of that node. It follows that S 
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contains all well-founded nodes, where a node x is well-founded if there is 
no infinite sequence x0, x1, of nodes such that x0=x and xi is the 
successor of xi+ , for all i30. Let O(x) be the universal second-order (n:) 
formula 
(V’s)(lcl(S) -+ S(x)). 
Thus, 0(.x) expresses the property that x is well-founded. Finally, since G 
is acyclic if and only if all its nodes are well-founded, it follows that 
CYCLICITY is expressible by the sentence I Q(x), which is the 
Zi (Ackermann) sentence 
(3S)(3x)(Vly)(3z)(((E(z, Y) A lS(Z)) ” S(Y)) A lS(X)). 
Note that the first-order quantifier prefix is of the form 3V3. 
Finally, we show that a C: (Ackermann) sentence may not be equivalent 
to any 2’: (Bernays-Schonlinkel) sentence. 
PROPOSITION 2.1. There is no .Z: (Bernays-Schiinfinkel) sentence which 
defines CYCLICITY on the collection of finite graphs. 
Proof: Assume that CYCLICITY is definable by a C: (Bernays-SchGn- 
fmkel) sentence Y of the form 
XIX, . x,vytqx, ) . ..) x,,, y, S). 
Let C be a graph that is a simple cyclic with more than n vertices. Since 
C t= !P, there are relations SC on C and vertices a,, . . . . a, from C such that 
C k Wa,, . . . . a,, y, SC). 
Let B be the subgraph of C induced by a,, . . . . a,, and let SC be the restric- 
tions to B of the relations SC. Since universal first-order sentences are 
preserved under substructures, we have that 
B k vy@a,, . . . . a,, Y, SE) 
and hence B k Y, i.e., B contains a cycle. This, however, is a contradiction, 
since B is a proper subgraph of the simple cycle C. 1 
Using a similar argument, we can also show that SATISFIABILITY is 
another example of a property that is expressible by a Zi (Ackermann) 
sentence, but not expressible by any 2’: (Bernays-Schonlinkel) sentence. 
We conclude this section by conjecturing that there are Zi (Bernays- 
Schonlinkel) sentences that are not equivalent to any Ci (Ackermann) sen- 
tence on finite graphs and, thus, these two classes of existential second-order 
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sentences are of distinct expressive power. The C: (Bernays-Schonlinkel) 
sentences expressing DISCONNECTIVITY and 2-COLORABILITY 
appear to be natural candidates for the above conjecture. 
3. THE 0-l LAW FOR Ci (ACKERMANN) PROPERTIES 
3.1. Random Structures 
Let R be a vocabulary and let C be the collection of all finite relational 
structures over R with initial segments { 1, 2, . . . . n} of the positive integers 
as universes. If P is a property of (some) structures in C, then let ,u,,(P) be 
the fraction of structures in C of cardinality n satisfying P. The asymptotic 
probability p(P) on C is defined to be 
provided this limit exists. In this probability space all structures in C with 
the same number of elements carry the same probability. An equivalent 
description of this space can be obtained by assigning truth values to tuples 
independently and with the same probability (cf. (Bollobas, 1985)). 
If L is a logic, we say that the O-1 law holds for L on C in case p(P) 
exists and is equal to 0 or 1 for every property P expressible in the logic 
L. A standard method for establishing O-1 laws, originating in 
Fagin (1976), is to prove that the following transfer theorem for L holds: 
there is an infinite structure A over the vocabulary R such that for any 
property P expressible in L we have 
A k Pop(P)= 1. 
It turns out that there is a unique (up to isomorphism) countable structure 
A which satisfies the above equivalence for all the logics mentioned in the 
introduction for which the &l law holds. 
We call A the countable random structure over the vocabulary R. One 
characterization of the random structure A is as the unique (up to 
isomorphism) countable model of an infinite set of extension axioms, 
which, intuitively, assert that every type can be extended to any other 
possible type consistent with it.3 More precisely, if x = (x,, . . . . x,) is a 
sequence of variables, then an n-R-type t(x) in the variables x over R is a 
maximal consistent set of equality and negated equality formulas, and 
atomic and negated atomic formulas from the vocabulary R in the 
variables xi, . . . . x,. We say that an (n + 1)-R-type s(x, z) e.xtends the type 
3 See (Compton, 1988) for the history of the extension axioms. 
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t(x) if t is a subset of s. Every type t(x) can be also viewed as a quantifier- 
free formula that is the conjunction of all members of t(x). With each pair 
of types s and t such that s extends t we associate a first-order extension 
axiom T which states that 
VJx)(t(x) + (3z) 4x3 =I). 
We show here that the g-1 law holds for the Cl (Ackermann) class by 
establishing a transfer theorem for it. One of the two directions in the 
transfer theorem follows from a result that holds for arbitrary IIt (univer- 
sal second-order) sentences, Indeed, in (Kolaitis and Vardi, 1987) we 
proved the following : 
LEMMA 3.1. Let A be the countable random structure and let (VS) B(S) 
be an arbitrary IZ: sentence. !fA + (VS) %(S), then ~((‘6) %(S)) = 1. 
The analog of the above lemma for arbitrary Cl sentences is false, since, 
for example, the statement “there is a function which is l-1 and not onto” 
is true on A, but fails on every finite structure. 
3.2. Z;(Ackermann) Sentences on the Random Structure A 
Our goal here is to establish the following: 
THEOREM 3.2. Let A be the countable random structure over the 
vocabulary R and let Y be a C: (Ackermann) sentence. [f A k Y, then 
p(Y)= 1. 
This theorem will be obtained by combining three separate lemmas. 
Since the whole argument is rather involved, we start with a “high-level” 
description of the structure of the proof. 
l We first isolate a syntactic condition, which we call condition (x), 
for Ci (Ackermann) sentences, and in Lemma 3.5 we show that if Y is a 
C: (Ackermann) sentence which is true on A, then condition (x) holds for 
!I? At the end, it will actually turn out that this condition is also sufficient 
for truth of Cl (Ackermann) sentences on the random structure A. 
l We define richness properties E,, s 2 1, of (some) finite structures 
over R. These properties can be viewed as a strong form of the extension 
axioms. We then show, in Lemma 3.10, that p(E,) = 1 for every s 3 1. The 
proof of this fact requires certain asymptotic estimates from probability 
theory, due to Chernoff ( 1952). 
l Finally, in Lemma 3.11, we prove that if Y is a 2: (Ackermann) 
sentence for which condition (x) holds, then for appropriately chosen s and 
for large n the sentence Y is true on all finite structures of cardinality n 
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over R that possess property E,; consequently, p(Y) = 1. In this last 
lemma, the existence of the predicates S that witness Y is proved by a 
probabilistic argument, which in spirit is analogous to the technique used 
by Gurevich and Shelah (1983) to show the finite satisliability property of 
first-order formulas in the Giidel class without equality. 
DEFINITION 3.3. Let T be a vocabulary, i.e., a set of relational symbols. 
We introduce various concepts about types over the vocabulary T that will 
be used in the sequel. 
l If t(x,, . ..) xk) is a k-T-type, then, for any m with 1 6 m 6 k, let 
t(x ,,, . . . . xi,) be the m-T-type obtained by deleting from t(x,, . . . . xk) all 
formulas in which a variable y # xi,, . . . . xim occurs. 
l If S c T, then the restriction of a k-T-type t to S is the k-S-type 
obtained by deleting from t all formulas in which a predicate symbol in 
T - S occurs. 
l If @I, . ..> xk, xk + 1 ) is a (k + 1 )-T-type, and 4’ is a variable different 
from all the xls, then t(x, , . . . . xk, xk+ ,/JT) is the (k+ l)-T-type obtained by 
replacing all occcurrences of .x~+, by y. 
l If t(x,, . ..) xk) is a k-T-type, then for every i, 1 < id k, let 
P(x, ( . ..) x k, y) be the unique (k + l)-T-type in the variables x,, . . . . xk, JJ 
that extends the type t(x,, . . . . xk) (i.e., t is a subset of t”‘) and contains the 
equality formula y = x,. 
l Let t(x,, . . . . xk) be a k-T-type, and let (p(x,, . . . . XJ be a quantifier- 
free formula in the variables xi, . . . . xk. We say that t satisfies cp if cp is true 
under the truth assignment that assigns true to an atomic formula precisely 
when it is a member of t. 
l Let D be a structure over a vocabulary T and let c = (c,, . . . . c,) be 
a sequence of elements from D. The type t:of c on D is the unique m-T- 
type t(z, , . . . . z,) determined by the atomic and negated atomic formulas 
that the sequence c satisfies on D, under the assignment zi + ci, 1 d id m. 
We write t,, instead of t:, when the vocabulary is understood. We say that 
a sequence c realizes a type t on a structure D if t, = t. 
Let Y be a Z: (Ackermann) sentence of the form 
where cp is a quantifier-free formula over the vocabulary (R, S) = R u S. 
DEFINITION 3.4. We say that condition (x) holds for !P if there are a 
k-(R, S)-type t,(x,, . . . . x/z) and a set P of (k + 1)-(R, S)-types t(x,, . ..) .xk, y) 
extending t,(x,, . . . . xk) such that the following three clauses are true: 
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1. P contains as a member the (k+ 1)-(R, S)-type $(x1, . . . . .xk, ,r), 
for every i = 1 .. k. Equivalently, for every i, 1 < id k, there is a type 
t,(x, 3 ..., xk, y) in P such that 
t,(x,, . ..) Xk, y/x,) = t,(x,, . ..) Xk). 
2. P is R-rich ouer t,(x,, . . . . x,); i.e., every (k + 1)-R-type 
t(x,, . . . . xk, u) extending the restriction of t,(x,, . . . . xk) to R is itself the 
restriction of some (k + 1)-(R, S)-type in P to R. 
3. For each t(x,, . . . . xkr J) in P there is a (k+I+ 1)-(R, S)-type 
f’(x,, ..., xk, I’, zl, ..., z,) such that t C t’, t’ satisfies cp(x,, . . . . xk, y, z,, . . . . z,), 
and for each zi, 1 d i6 I, the (k + 1)-(R, S)-type f’(~,, . . . . .xk, z,/y) is in P. 
LEMMA 3.5. Let A be the countable random structure over the vocabulary 
R and let Y be a .Ti (Ackermann) sentence. If A + Y, then condition (x) 
holds for Y. 
Proof: Assume that Y is of the form 
(3s)(3.~,).“(3x,)(v~~)(32,)...(3Z,) q(x,, . . . . xk, J’, Z,, . . . . 21, R, S) 
and that the countable random structure A satisfies it. Then there are 
relations S* on A and elements a,, . . . . ak from A such that 
A /= VJ~Z, .. ‘3z[q(a), . . . . ak, y, zl, . . . . z/, R, S*). 
We take t,(x,, . . . . xk) to be the (R, S)-type tui,..,,,, of the sequence 
(a , , ..., ak) on the expanded (R, S)-structure (A, S*). For every element b 
from A, we consider the (k + 1)-(R, S)-type t, ,,.,.., rrk,b(~i, . . . . xk, y) of the 
sequence (a,, . . . . ak, b) on the expanded structure (A, S*) and we let P be 
the set of all such types. 
We now claim that the type t, and the set P satisfy clauses (1 ), (2), and 
(3) of condition (x). Note first that P contains the (k-t 1)-(R, S)-types 
t;(x,, . . . . xk, y), 1 < i 6 k, because 
t u ,,..,, uk,q(x, > “‘1 -yk, ,v) = t;;‘(x, > “‘3 -xk, y)> 
for every i, 1 d id k. In order to show that P is R-rich over to, we consider 
an arbitrary (k+ I)-R-type t(x,, . . . . xk, y) extending the restriction of t, to 
R. Note that the restriction of t, to R is equal to the type tt,,---,,k. Since the 
countable random structure A satisfies the extension axioms, there is an 
element b, in A such that the (k + 1)-R-type tf,,,,,,,k,ba of the sequence 
(a I, . . . . ak, 6,) is equal to t(x,, . . . . xk, y). But then, from the definition of 
the set P, it follows that the (k + 1)-(R, S)-type tu,,..,,a,ho is in P and its 
restriction to R is equal to 2(x,, . . . . xk, y). 
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Clause (3) in condition (1) can be easily verified using the definitions 
and the fact that A + Y. 1 
Before stating the richness properties E, and showing that they hold on 
almost ail structures, we need to digress briefly to probability theory. 
Recall that a Bernoulli random variable X with mean p takes only two 
values, 1 (“success”) and 0 (“failure”) with probabilities p and 1 - p respec- 
tively. A binomial distribution S,,, with parameters n and p is the sum 
C:=, Xi of independent Bernoulli random variables X,, 1 < i < n, each of 
mean p; i.e., it gives the number of “successes” in n independent trials. 
Several asymptotic upper bounds are known on the probability of the tail 
of the binomial distribution. Of particular interest to us are the bounds due 
to Chernoff (1952) (cf. also (Bollobas, 1985)) as described by the following 
well known result: 
THEOREM 3.6. Let S,,,p be a binomial distribution with parameters n and 
p. For any h>O 
W IS, p -npj >h)<2ePZh2/“. 
Let m be a fixed integer less than n. If we set h = p(n -m)-& and 
apply Chernoff’s theorem above, then, after a sequence of straightforward 
computations, we obtain the following asymptotic bound: 
COROLLARY 3.7. Let S,,, be a binomial distribution with parameters n 
andp and let m be a fixed integer. There is an integer n, = n,(p, m) such that 
for all n > n, 
DEFINITION 3.8. We say that an (m + 1 )-R-type t(w, , . . . . u’,, w,+ ,) 
properly extends an m-R-type t(w,, . . . . wm) if t(w,, . . . . wm) c 
t(w,, . . . . w,, w, + ,) and t(w, , . . . . VV,,,, u‘, + ,) contains as members the 
formulas u’,+ 1 # u’~, . . . . u’,+ , # w,,. 
DEFINITION 3.9. Let s b 1 be fixed. We say that a finite structure D over 
R with n elements satisfies property E, if the following holds: 
l For every number m with 1 6 m d s, every sequence c = (c,, . . . . c,) 
from D, and every (m + l)-R-type t’(w, , . . . . w,, w, + ,) properly extending 
the type t , ( w ,  , . . . . w,) of c on D, there are more than & different elements 
d in D such that each sequence (c,, . . . . c,, d) realizes the type 
t(w, 5 ..., w,, U’, + I). 
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The properties E, can be viewed as a strong form of the extension 
axioms. They assert not only that can every type be extended to any other 
type consistent with it, but also that many such extensions exist. Note that 
if a structure satisfies the richness property E, for some S, then it satisfies 
all extension axioms in which the types involved have no more than .s 
variables. 
LEMMA 3.10. For every s > 1 there are a positive constant c and a natural 
number n, such that .for any n 2 n, 
p,(E,,)3 1 -n’+‘e In. 
In particular, p(E,,) = 1; i.e., almost all structures over R satisfy property E,, 
for every s 3 1. 
ProoJ: The proof of this lemma uses the asymptotic bound on the 
probability of the tail of the binomial distribution given by the preceding 
Corollary 3.7. The idea is to consider first a random structure D with n 
elements, a sequence c from D, and a type t’ properly extending t,, and 
then apply this bound to the binomial distribution obtained by counting 
the number of elements d such that the sequence (c,, . . . . c,, d) realizes t’. 
We then iterate through all types and all sequences c = (c,, . . . . c,) for 
1 <m d s. We need one more definition before delving in the details of the 
proof. 
Let D be a structure over R with n elements, let c = (c,, . . . . c,) be a 
sequence of elements from D and let t’(u., , . . . . VV,, u’,+ ,) be an (m + l)-R- 
type properly extending the type tJw,, . . . . w,) of c. We say that c is poor 
for t’(w,, . . . . wmr M’,+, ) if there are at most & distinct elements from D 
such that the type te,d(w,, . . . . MI,, u‘,,~+ ,) of the sequence c, d on D is equal 
to t’(w,, . ..) w,, w,+ ,). 
We consider the following events on the space of random R structures 
with n elements: 
l If t ( w , ,  . ..) wm) and t’(w, , . . . . w,, w, + ,) are two R-types such that 
f’(W,, ..., w,, w,+ 1 ) properly extends t(wl, . . . . w,), then the event A , ( t ,  t’) 
consists of all R-structures D for which there is a sequence c = (c,, . . . . c,) 
from D that realizes t(w,, . . . . wm) and is poor for t’(w,, . . . . w,, w,+ ,). 
l The event B, consists of all R-structures D for which there are 
types t(w,, . . . . w,) and t ’ (w,, . . . . M’,, w,+ ,) such that DE A,(t, t’); i.e., 
B, = u A,(t, t’). 
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Note that the property E, is the complement of the union of the events B,, 
1 <m<s, and thus 
Pr(E,)=l-Pr 
We compute now upper bounds on probabilities of the events A,(t, t’). 
Consider a random structure D with n elements over the vocabulary R and 
a sequence c = (c,, . . . . c,) from D which realizes the type t(w,, . . . . w,). With 
each of the remaining n-m elements d of D we associate a Bernoulli 
random variable, where “success” means that the type t,,, is equal to the 
type f(~.,, . . . . w,, wmfl ). The probability p = p(m) of “success” is a con- 
stant that depends on m and the underlying vocabulary R only. The sum 
of these independent Bernoulli random variables is a binomial distribution 
s p,n~m that gives the number of elements d from D such that 
t c.d = t’(w,, . ..) w,, W,+, ). From Corollary 3.7 it follows then that 
Pr(c is poor for t’(i~~, . . . . u’,, u’,, ,)) < eppzn., (2) 
for all large n. Since there are at most n”’ tuples c = (c,, . . . . c,) that realize 
t( W’ ) . ..) w,), we conclude that 
Pr(A,(t, t’)) < nmepP2” (3) 
for all large n. Let k(m) be the number of pairs t(w,, . . . . w,), 
f’(M.‘, . ..) W’,, w,+, ) of types such that t’(w,, . . . . w,, VV, + ,) extends 
t( w, ) . . . . w,), 1 <m < s. From the preceding inequality (3) and the fact that 
B, = U A,(t, t’) we have that 
Pr( B,) < k(m) n”‘e ~P2(m)~ 
for all large n. It follows that 
(4) 
(5) 
for all large n. If we put k = max(k( l), . . . . k(s)) and c = min(p2( 1 ), . . . . p’(s)), 
then we have that 
L, k(m)nme-J’2(“)“<k ( f, n-) e~-““<ksn”e--‘” (6) 
m=l 
for all large n, and consequently 
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for all large n. Finally, from Eq. (1) and the last inequality (7), it follows 
that 
Pr(E,)> 1 -,‘+ ‘e-‘” 
for all large n. 1 
The last lemma in this section provides the link between condition (x), 
property E,, s 3 1, and satisfiability of ,?I: (Ackermann) sentences on finite 
structures over R. 
LEMMA 3.11. Let Y be a 2’: (Ackermann) sentence of the form 
(~S)(~XI)... (3Xk)(vJ’Y)(3Z,) ... (IZ,) d-u,, -,-xk, I’, ZI, . . . . =I, R, s) 
for which condition (x) holds. There is a natural number n, such that ,for 
every n>n,, if D is a finite structure over R with n elements satisfying 
property E, + ,+ , , then D k ‘P. 
Proof: Let D be a finite structure with n elements over the vocabulary 
R satisfying property Ek+,+ r, let t,(x,, . . . . xk) be the k-(R, S)-type and let 
P be the set of (k+ 1)-(R, S)-types given by condition (x), and let 
t,Rb, 3 ..., xk) be the restriction of t, to the vocabulary R. Recall that if a 
structure satisfies the richness property E,s for some s, then it satisfies all 
extension axioms in which the types involved have no more than s 
variables. As a result, there is a sequence a,, . . . . ak of elements from D such 
that 
t R  a,, .,+(x,, .  .  .  .  xk) = & , ,  .  .  .  .  xk). 
We now fix such a sequence a,, . . . . ak and we construct a probability 
space of (R, S)-structures with D as the underlying R-structure. We will 
show that for all large n there is an (R, S)-structure (D, SD) in this space 
such that 
(D, SD) k= (VY)(~ZI ). (32,) &al, . . . . ak? Y, zI, . . . . ~0. 
Thus will be achieved by showing that the probability of a structure in this 
space satisfying the above first-order sentence is greater than zero. 
Let ty, . . . . t”, be an enumeration of all (k + 1)-R-types in the variables 
x1, . . . . xk, y extending the type tt(x,, . . . . xk). For each i, 1 < id N, let 
P, = {t E P : the restriction of t to R is equal to tr} 
Clause (2) of condition (x) implies that each Pi is a nonempty set; let v, > 1 
be the cardinality of Pi, 1 d id N. 
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The probability space of (R, S)-structures is constructed in the following 
way : 
l We assign to the sequence a,, . . . . ak the type t,(x,, . . . . xk) as its 
k-(R, S)-type. Note that this is possible, because tfiRl,,.,,,k = if. 
l If b # a,, . . . . ak is an element from the universe of D such that 
tR Ul,....W,b = t:, then we assign to the sequence a,, . . . . ak, b a (k+ 1)-(R, S)- 
type from the set Pi, randomly with probability l/ri. 
l I f  (61, .  .  .  .  b,), m 2 2, is a sequence of elements from the universe of 
D such that at least two of them are different from a,, . . . . ak, then for every 
m-ary predicate Q in the vocabulary S we assign a truth value to the 
atomic formula Q(b,, . . . . b,) randomly with probability 4. 
If (D, SD) is a structure in this space and b is an element from its 
universe, then the (k+ 1)-(R, S)-type t, ,,..., ok,b(~x,, . . . . xk, JJ) of the sequence 
a,, ...1 ukr b is in the set P. lndeed, this follows from the construction of the 
probability space and clauses (1) and (2) of condition (x). Let 
t(x,, . . . . xk, y, 21, . . . . z, ) be the (k + I + 1)-(R, S)-type associated to the 
(k + 1 HR Ww to ,,._., uk,h in P according to clause (3) of condition (x). 
We write tR for the restriction of t to the vocabulary R. 
If (c,, . ..) c,), with 1 < m < I, is a sequence of elements from (D, SD) such 
that 
t o ,..... ak,b,c,. ..,c,,, (x , , . . . . Xk, y, =I , . . . . z, ) = t(x,, . ..) Xk, J, i:,, . . . . z,), 
then we say that this sequence is an m-(R, S)-witness fir b. Similarly, we 
say that (ci , . . . . c,) is an m-R-witness for b in case 
tfl ,,, Q b <, ,,, (’ (x,, . . . . xk, y, zl, z,)= tR(X,, “‘, -yk, ZI, . . . . z,). . . ,. ,,m 
Let W(R,S)(y, z,, . . . . z,) be the formula describing the event that (z,, . . . . zm) 
is an m-(R, S)-witness for 4’. If 
(D, SD) I= WW, 1. . @,I WcRxS’( Y, ~1, . . . . z,), 
then it follows from clause (3) of condition (x) that 
(R SD) k (b)(3z1) ...VzJ ~$a,, . . . . ak, L’, zl, . ..- z/J. 
We now fix an element b from D and compute upper bounds on the 
probability 
Pr((Vz,)...(Vz,)l W’R,S’(b, zl, . . . . 2,)). 
For this we show by induction on m, 1 <m 6 I, that there is a sequence 
(c I, . . . . c,) of elements from D which is an m-(R, S)-witness for 6; at the 
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same time, we compute upper bounds on the probability that a given 
(m - 1)-(R, S)-witness for b has no extension to an m-(R, S)-witness for b. 
Assume, by induction hypothesis, that (c,, . . . . cm ,) is a fixed (m - l)- 
(R, S)-witness for b. Let U = U(c,, . . . . c,~ ,) be the set of all elements c 
from D such that (c,, . . . . c, ~, , c) is an m-R-witness for 6. Note that the 
richness property Ek+ ,+ i implies that U(c,, . . . . c,) is a nonempty set. If the 
type ltxl) . . . . xk? y, zl? . . . . z,+ I? z,,) does not properly extend the type 
t(x,, . . . . xk, y, zr, . . . . z, ,), then one of the sequences (c,, . . . . c, , , c), with 
CE {a,, . . . . ok, b, Cl, . . . . C, , }, is an m-(R, S)-witness for b. In particular, 
Pr((Vc)i W(R,S’(b, cl, . . . . cm- ,, c)) = 0. 
Assume that the (k + m + I )-(R, S)-type t(x, , . . . . xk, I’, 7 i 1 > “‘> =m 1 > z,, 1 
properly extends the type (k + m)-(R, S)-type t(x,, . . . . xk, y, z,, z, ,) and 
let c be an element from the set U(c,, . . . . cm ~ ,). The probability 
Pr( W (R,S)(b, c,, . . . . c m ,, c)) 
is a constant p = p(i, m) with 0 < p < 1 that depends only on m, the arities 
and the number of the predicates in the vocabulary S, and the cardinality 
ui of the set P, to which the (k + 1 )-R-type tfl,,,,,,k ( belongs (note that we 
are using here the second part of clause (3) in condition (I)). Let p,, be the 
minimum of the probability values p(i, m), 1 d id N and 1 d m d I, above. 
We have that 
Pr((Vc)l WcR,S)(b, c,, . . . . c,+ ,, c)) = Pr n 1 W(R,S)(b, c,, . . . . C, ,,c) 
(.EC 
Since the events in the intersection are independent we have that 
Pr((Vc)l W’R,S’(b, c,, . . . . c,+, , c)) = n Pr(l W(R,S’(b, c,, . . . . c,,~ ,, c)). 
(.EU 
The structure D, however, satisfies the richness property E, + [+, and, as a 
result, the set U(c,, . . . . c,,~ ,) has more than & elements. It follows then 
that 
Pr((Vc)l W(R,S)(b, c,, . . . . cm-,, c))<(l -p,,)J. 
In particular, there is an element c,, in U(c,, . . . . c, ,) such that the 
sequence (c,, . . . . c,_ ,, c,) is an m-(R, S)-witness for 6. 
We are now ready to compute upper bounds for the probability that for 
a fixed element b from D no sequence (c,, . . . . c,) exists that is an I-(R, S)- 
witness for b. This is the same as the probability that every sequence 
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(C , , . . . . cI- i) which is an (I- 1)-(R, S)-witness for b has no extension to an 
I-(R, S)-witness (c,, . . . . c[-i, c,) for b. Since there are at most n’- ’ sequen- 
ces that are (I- 1)-(R, S) witnesses for b, it follows from the preceding 
probability bounds that 
Pr((Vc,)...(Vc,)...(Vc,)l W(b, c,, . . . . c,))dn’- ‘(1 --p,,)A. 
Since D has n elements, we conclude that 
Pr(@b)(Vc,) . ..(Vcl)l W’R*S’(b, c,, . . . . c/))<n’(l - G pO)d . 
Thus, if D possesses the richness property Ektl+ , then in the probability 
space of (R, S)-structures 
Pr((D, SD) k (vJ”y)(3Z,)...(3Z,) q(Q,, . . . . ak, .Y,Zl, . . . . z,))k 1 -n’(l -Lh+‘. 
Since lim n _ ,(n’( 1 - pO)J) = 0, it follows that for all large n if D is an 
R-structure with n elements possessing property Ek+ ,+ i, then D satisfies 
the Ackermann sentence Y. 1 
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.2. Combining now this with 
Lemma 3.1, we derive the main result of this section. 
THEOREM 3.12. The 0-l law holds for the Z: (Ackerrnann) class on the 
collection C of all finite structures over a vocabulary R. Moreover, if A is the 
countable random structure over R and Y is a Ci (Ackermann) sentence, 
then the following are equivalent: 
1. Aj=Y. 
2. Condition (x) holds for Y. 
3. p(Y)=l. 
To obtain the &l law we have combined tools developed in (Giidel, 
1932) and (Gurevich and Shelah, 1983) (to show the solvability of the 
Giidel class without equality) with asymptotic estimates from probability 
theory (Chernoff, 1952). A natural question to ask is whether these tools 
can be used to prove the t&l law for the C: (Godel) class without equality. 
Unfortunately, this approach runs into problems that are similar to the 
difficulties encountered in dealing with the Gijdel class with equality 
(cf. Giidel, 1932; Gurevich and Shelah, 1983). 
4. COMPLEXITY BOUNDS 
In the previous section we established that the &l law holds for the class 
Zi (Ackermann). Moreover, we showed that for any Z: (Ackermann) 
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sentence Y the asymptotic probability p(Y) is equal to 1 if and only if 
condition (x) holds for Y. 
It immediately follows that the decision problem for the probabilities of 
2’; (Ackermann) sentences is solvable. In fact, since we can without loss of 
generality restrict the vocabulary R to the predicate symbols occuring in Y, 
the number of relevant types is at most doubly exponential in the length of 
Y. Consequently, it is not too hard to see that condition (x) can be tested 
in nondeterministic doubly exponential time. It turns out that we can do 
better than that. In this section we give tight upper and lower bounds. 
In general, there is no a priori bound on the arity of the predicates in the 
vocabulary R, i.e., R is unbounded. A case of special interest is when the 
vocabulary R is bounded, i.e., there is a bound on the arity of predicates in 
R. For example, if we are interested in graph properties, then R contains 
a single binary predicate. This distinction has a significant impact on the 
complexity of the decision problem. (One can also make the distinction 
between the bounded and the unbounded cases for the quantified 
vocabulary S. We do not make this distinction here as it does not seem to 
be very natural.) 
Recall that ZyP is the second level of the exponential hierarchy. It can 
be described as the class of languages accepted by alternating exponential- 
time Turing machines in two alternations where the machine start state is 
existential (Chandra et al., 1981) or as the class NEXPNP of languages 
accepted by nondeterministic exponential-time Turing machines with 
oracles from NP (Hartmanis et al., 1985). 
THEOREM 4.1. 1. The decision problem for the probabilities of Zl 
(Ackermann) sentences over bounded vocabularies in NEXPTIME-complete 
2. The decision problem for the probabilities of Zi (Ackermann) 
sentences over unbounded vocabularies is CyP-complete.4 
In the absence of equality we can do even better. Let C f (Ackermann ~ ) 
be the class Zi (Ackermann) without equality. 
THEOREM 4.2. The decision problem for the probabilities qf Zl 
(Ackermann ) sentences is EXPTIME-complete. 
Note that for the Zl (Ackermann ~ ) classes it does not make a difference 
whether or not the vocabulary is bounded. 
In the following subsections we describe the lower and upper bounds in 
more detail. 
’ To OUT knowledge this is the first instance of a natural problem that is complete for Zyp. 
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4.1. Lower Bounds 
The lower bounds are established by considering the special case where 
the underlying vocabulary R is empty. 
Let q be an arbitrary first-order sentence over some vocabulary S. The 
following simple, but useful, proposition (due to K. Compton) relates the 
finite satistiability of cp to the value of the asymptotic probability of a 
certain existential second-order sentence over the empty vocabulary. 
PROPOSITION 4.3. Let cp he a ,first-order sentence over a relational 
vocabulary S. Then 
cp is finitely satisfiable o u( (3X)( 3s) cp”) = 1, 
where X is a new unary predicate, cp x is the first-order sentence obtained 
from 9 by relativizing all first-order quantifiers in cp to X, and the asymptotic 
probability u((3X)(3S) cp”) is over the empty relational vocabulary. 
Proof The result follows immediately from the definitions and the 
observation that for each n B 1 there is a unique structure with domain 
{ 1, “.> n] over the empty vocabulary. [ 
The preceding Proposition 4.3 implies that a lower bound for finite 
satisfiability of first-order sentences in some prefix class is also a lower 
bound for the decision problem for the probabilities of the associated 
existential second-order sentences. 
Lewis (1980) and Fiirer (1981) have independently shown that the finite 
satisfiability problem for the first-order Ackermann class without equality 
is EXPTIME-complete. This gives immediately the lower bound for 
Theorem 4.2. It remains to prove the lower bounds of Theorems 4.1 for the 
class Z; (Ackermann). 
PROPOSITION 4.4. The finite satisfiability problem for first-order Acker- 
mann sentences over a vocabulary S is NEXPTIME-hard. Consequently, the 
decision problem for the probabilities of C: (Ackermann I sentences over 
bounded vocabularies is NEXPTIME-hard. 
Proof The basic idea of the proof is that a nondeterministic Turing 
machine A4 that runs in time T(n) can be simulated by a nondeterministic 
Turing machine M’ that operates deterministically using space O(log T(n)) 
after first guessing a tape of length T2(n). The idea is that a tape of length 
T*(n) can be viewed as a sequence of T(n) machine IDS, each of length 
T(n). That is, such a tape can encode the computation of M. All that is left 
for M’ is to check that the tape it guessed indeed encodes an accepting 
computation of M. This can be done in a deterministic manner using space 
O(lw T(n)). 
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Thus, we can prove that the following problem is NEXPTIME-complete 
for some c, d> 1. 
Given a deterministic Turing machine M (with a read-only 
input tape and a read-write worktape) and a unary number 
n 30: Is there an input x of length cn such that M does not 
reject x using dn work cells‘? 
It is clear that the problem is in NEXPTIME. To show hardness, 
suppose that M, is a nondeterministic exponential-time bounded Turing 
machine that accepts a NEXPTIME-complete language. To check whether 
M, accepts x, we construct a deterministic linear-space bounded Turing 
machine M, that rejects words that are not accepting computations of M, 
over x. Thus, M, accepts x iff there is an exponentially long input that is 
not rejected by M,. 
We reduce the above problem to the finite satisliability problem of the 
Ackermann class. Given a machine A4 and a unary number n, we construct 
a first-order Ackermann sentence cp such that CJJ is satisfiable if and only if 
M does not reject some input of length C” using dn work cells. 
Let the alphabet of M be C = { yO, . . . . v,}, where p = 2” ‘. For simplicity 
we do not distinguish between input alphabet and work alphabet. Further- 
more, we assume that the alphabet consists also of composite symbols that 
encode the state of the machine and the location of the workhead (i.e., a 
composite symbol (s, a) denotes that the machine is in state s and the head 
is reading the symbol a). It is convenient to assume that the work tape has 
left and right endmarkers; these are special symbols in C that are never 
rewritten. We also assume that if the machine does not reject the input then 
the computation continues forever. 
We assume that the operation of the machine M is described by partial 
functions ,f: .Y4 + Z and g: C* 4 ( - 1, 0, 1 }, with the following meanings : 
l f(ct, fl, y, 6) = p means that if the input head is reading the symbol a, 
and the content of the cells i- 1, i, i+ 1 of the worktape in the current 
configuration is /?, y, 6, then the cell i in the next configuration contains p. 
l g(a, /3) = k means that if the input head is reading the symbol c[ and 
the work head is reading the symbol /?, then the input head is moving in 
direction k (1 means move right, 0 means no movement, and - 1 means 
move left). 
In the following construction we use the convention that if S is a 
predicate symbol and v is a sequence of variables, then S’(v) denotes S(v) 
and So(v) denotes 1 S(v). 
The sentence cp is of the form 
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where 0 is a quantifier-free formula over the vocabulary S. The vocabulary 
S contains n-ary predicate symbols P,, . . . . P, ~, . The idea is that for the 
formula to be satisfied there have to be elements uO, . . . . a,_ , such that the 
truth values of the facts Pi(u,, . . . . u,), where the ui)s range over the ai’s, 
encode the exponentially long input. Let ie (0, . . . . p} have the binary 




Intuitively, P,,(v) denotes the fact that the cell pointed to by v contains the 
symbol yi. 
The existentially quantified variable y, is intended to be the initial con- 
figuration of M. The universally quantified variable y is intended to range 
over configurations of A4, and the existentially quantified variable z is 
intended to be the successor configuration. The quantified variables 
21, ..‘, z, are intended to point to the location of the input head. That is, 
these variables will always be instantiated by elements from the set 
bob~,,~~c ~ 1). Th us, one should think of (z,, . . . . z,) as an n-digit c-ary 
The vocabulary S contains unary predicate symbols Q,,i for 1 d id dn 
and 0 <<jdm - 1. The truth values of the facts Qi,i(y) encode the work 
tape of a configuration y. Let i E { 0, . . . . p} have the binary representation 
io...i,p,. Let Qk,Jy) denote the conjunction 
Intuitively, Qk,,,( y) denotes the fact that the kth cell of the worktape in the 
configuration y contains the symbol yi. 
Finally, the vocabulary S contains predicate symbols T,,, and Cj for 
1 < i < n and 0 < j < c - 1. The truth values of the facts T,,J y) encode the 
location of the head over the input tape in configuration y. The truth 
values of the facts Ci( y) encode the carry if 1 is added to the input head 
location. We define three formulas that denote the relationship between 
head locations in configurations y and z: 
l input(z) = input(y) denote the formula 
A ‘A’ Ti,i(~)* Ti,,(Z). 
r=, ,=o 
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l input(z) = input( y) + 1 denote the formula 
.^ 14; ClC,(Y)-, (T,.,(Y)== ~,,,(=))I 
* CC,(r)+ (T,,,(Y)- T,.,+,m,,,,(-111 
l input(z) = input( I’) - 1 denote the formula 
,&, :/)I ClC,(z) + (T,.,(J)* Ti.,(-))l 
A CC,(z)-+ (T,.,(z)- T,.,. ,p,,od<d~))l. 
It remains to describe the quantifier-free formula 6, that forces all the 
predicates to behave according to their intended meaning. Let 0 be the 
conjunction of the following clauses. 
1. The variables z,, . . . . zn are intended to point to the input cell 
pointed to by the T,,, predicates. This is captured by the clause 
(A ‘i’ T,,,(y) A (;; ‘A’i,=s,- T,.,(y)). 
,= I ,=o I=1 ,=o 
2. The fact that the left and right endmarkers of the worktape, y, and 
y,, are never rewritten is captured by the clause 
Q,,;,(Y) A PA?,(Y). 
3. The fact that successive worktapes are related in the appropriate 
manner is captured by the clause 
dn I 
/j /‘j P,(zl, . ..t z,,) * Q,-,.,AY) * Q,.,(Y) * Q,+,.,(Y) 
,=2 (?./l.y,6)edom(f) 
+ Q,, ,(x,,~g,&). 
4. The fact that the carry is obtained by adding 1 to the input head 
location is captured by the clause 
C,(Y) A ;I’ (C,(Y)-= C, +I(Y) * T,., I(Y)). 
I=’ 
5. The fact that the input head is moving in the appropriate manner 
is captured by the clause 
i /j PAZ,, “‘> z,,) * Ql,,d~v) -+ input(;) = input(y) + Aa, B). 
I= 1 (x,p)tdom(fi) 
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6. The fact that initially the input head is at the left of the input tape 
is captured by the clause 
7. The fact that initially the worktape contains an initial content, say, 
a I > ..., Xd,,, is captured by the clause 
,&, Q;.,,(Yo), 
8. The fact that a rejecting conliguration, say /I,, . . . . fld,,, is never 
reached is captured by the clause 
It remains to prove that cp is finitely satisfiable if and only if A4 does not 
reject some input of length c” using dn work cells. If cp is finitely satisfiable, 
then from a finite model D of cp we can extract an input tape of length c” 
and a nonrejecting computation of M on the input tape that uses dn work 
cells. On the other hand, if there is an input tape of length cn that is not 
rejected by M using dn work cells, then we can use it to construct a finite 
model D for cp. Details are left to the reader. [ 
PROPOSITION 4.5. The decision problem for the probabilities of Ci 
(Ackermann) sentences over unbounded vocabularies in CyP-hard. 
Proof. We reduce the acceptance problem for Turing machines in Zyp 
to the decision problem for the probabilities of C: (Ackermann) sentences 
with an unbounded vocabulary. Given a machine A4 and an input x, we 
construct a Z: (Ackermann) sentence cp such that cp holds in the random 
structure A iff M accepts x (by Theorem 3.12, cp holds in A iff ,u((P) = 1. 
A Turing machine M in Zyp can be viewed as a nondeterministic 
machine that accepts an input x of length n if it has a nonrejecting com- 
putation CJ~ of length c” such that every computation CT~ of length C” 
extending (pi is accepting. We can also assume without loss of generality 
that M visits only cn cells, so we can encode a configuration of M by a tape 
of length c”, using composite symbols to encode the state and the head 
location. Thus, both 0, and gz can be encoded by strings of length c2”. 
Let the alphabet of M be ,.Y = {yO, . . . . y,}, where p = 2”- ‘. We assume 
that the alphabet consists also of composite symbols that encode the state 
of the machine and the location of the head. The operation of the machine 
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M is described by a relation p G C6 that describes the relationship between 
successive conligurations. Two configurations ti, and K~ are successive if 
whenever the cells i - 1, i, i + 1 contain the symbols CC,, x2, a3, then the 
same cells in rc2 contain symbols x4, #x5, a6 such that p(~, , . . . . x6). 
As done earlier, in the following construction we use the convention that 
if Q is a predicate symbol and v is a sequence of variables, then Ql(v) 
denotes Q(V) and Q’(v) denotes lQ(v). 
The sentence cp is of the form 
(3SWo) (34 , )(3Jo)(v.Y)(3z)(3z, ) (3z,,w:) 
. ..(3~.,,)...(3~~)...(3w~,)(B(S) A ((R, S)), 
where 8 and 5 are quantifier-free formulas over the vocabularies S and R, 
S, respectively. The vocabulary S contains 2n-ary predicate symbols 
PO, . ..) P, , . The conjunct 0 guarantees that M has a nonrejecting 
computation fr, on X; this computation is encoded by a c-S-type 
to@,, . . . . xc ,I. A s in the proof of Proposition 4.4, we guarantee that 
ro(xo, ..., X‘ 1) encodes a nonrejecting computation of M by simulating a 
polynomially space-bounded machine that check if a string of length c2” is 
a nonrejecting computation of M on X. 
The new part here is the conjunct 5, which guarantee that every com- 
putation CJ~ of length c” extending C, is accepting. The idea is to think of 
the universally quantified 4’ as ranging over all strings of length c2”. The 
vocabulary R contains (2n + 1)-ary predicate symbols R,, . . . . R, , For 
the formula cp to hold in the random structure A, there have to be elements 
uo, . . . . a,. - 1 such that the truth values of the facts P,(u,, . . . . uZn) and the 
truth values of the facts Ri( JJ, t‘, , . . . . u~,~), where the U,‘S range over the a,)~, 
encode strings of length c”‘. Let icz { 0, . . . . p} have the binary representation 
i,...i,-,. Let R,,( y, v), denote the conjunction 
m)( R;( Y, VI. 
, = 0 
Intuitively, R,(y, v) denotes the fact that the cell pointed to by v contains 
the symbol y,. 
All computations o2 of length cn extending C, are accepting if all strings 
g2 of length c2” either contain an accepting state, are not computations, or 
do not extend crl. These are all local conditions on the string u2. The idea 
is that the existentially quantified variables uf, . . . . z& point to the 
appropriate locations on the string. That is, these variables will always be 
instantiated by elements from the set (a,,, . . . . u, , ). Thus, one should think 
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of u’, . ..) u6 as n-digit c-ary numbers. The w’s are just auxiliary variables 
encoding carry. We will use them to express relationship between the u’s. 
We define some formulas that denote the relationship between locations: 
l carry(w’, u’+ 1) denotes the formula 
2n- I 
M$n#x” A /j (w’;#XpM’;+,#X~ A u;+,=x, ,). 
,=I 
This formula says that w’ is the carry when 1 is added to ui. 
l u ‘+ ’ = u’ + 1 denotes the formula 
i;: <A’ [W;=Xo+U;=Uf+‘] 
/=I k=O 
This formula says that u ‘+ ’ is the successor of u’, if carry(w’, ui + 1) holds. 
l carry(w, u’ + c”) denotes the formula 
n-l 
w,,#xo A /j (“;#x,ow’;+, #x0 A u;+,=x,, ,). 
,= I 
This formula says that w’ is the carry when 8’ is added to u’. 
l u4 = u1 + C~ denotes the formula 
i;l u/&-u; A A ‘r; [u+o++U;+‘] 
j=n+ I ,=I k=O 
A [~:#XO~(~~:=X~*U:+‘=X~+~(~,~~~))]. 
This formula says that u’+ ’ is the result of adding C” to u’, if 
carry( wi, ui + c”) holds. 
It remains to describe the quantifier-free formula 5 as <, A 
( t2 v t3 v 14), where the l’s are the following formulas : 
1. The variables ~1, . . . . U% are intended to point to cell locations. 
This is captured by the formula tl, 
jy ;;; ‘Q’ (u;=xk). 
r=l i=l k=O 
2. The fact that the string o2 contains an accepting state is captured 
by the formula r2, 
v R,( P, ~‘1, 
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where the disjunction ranges over all composite symbols y that encode 
accepting states. 
3. The fact that cr2 does not encode a computation is captured by the 
formula r3, 
A carry(w’, u’ + 1 ) 
,=I 
A u’=u’+ 1 A u3=u2+ 1 A u”=u”+ 1 A u6=u5+ 1 
A carry(w, u’ + 8’) A u4 = u’ + c” 
Note that we require that u’ not point to a cell on the last configuration 
of c2 in order to make sure that u’ and u4 indeed point to cells that are 
c” cells apart. We also resuire that u’, u*, u3 and similarly u4, u5, u6 point 
to three consecutive cells. 
4. The fact that g2 does not extend g1 is captured by the formula t4, 
i carry(w’, u’ + 1) 
!=I 
AU’=U’+l AU’=U’+l AU5=U4+1 AU6=U5+1 
n 
A /j U;=Xp, A A 2(=X0 A ; 24; = uf 
r=l ,= I I=!?+ I 
Ai ;I U;=U;+’ 4 A 
+q+ 
r=l ,=I ,=4 ,=I 
A A r; Pi,(d) i Ryn(,v, u’). 
~YI...,Yh)~P r=l ,=4 
Note that we use the P’s to refer to the computation 0, and we use the R’s 
to refer to the string ~7~. 
It remains to prove that cp holds in the random structure A over the 
vocabulary R iff M accepts X. Here we use the fact that if a = a,, . . . . a,. i 
are elements in the domain of A such that t,” is t,(x,, . . . . x,. i), then for 
every (k + l)-R-type t(x,, . . . . x,. , , y) extending t, there is an element b 
such that tzb is t(x,, . . . . x,.+, , y). In other words, the quantified variable y 
indeed ranges over all strings cr2 of length c”. 1 
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4.2. Upper Bounds 
The difficulty with condition (x) is that it is phrased in terms of types, 
and there are doubly exponentially many relevant types. To get a better 
algorithm, we replace condition (x) by conditions that are phrased in terms 
of partial types, which are subsets of types. The basic idea is that even 
though a type over k + I+ 1 variables contains an exponential amount of 
“information,” when we check in the third clause of condition (x) that t’ 
satisfies cp we only need a linear amount of “information” from t’. Let us 
now formalize this idea. We first deal with the class C: (Ackermann ~ ). The 
important feature of the lack of equality is that a set s of atomic formulas 
and negations of atomic formulas is consistent iff for no atomic formula 8 
we have that both 0 ES and 18 E s. 
Let Y be an Z: (Ackermann ~ ) sentence of the form 
where x = (x,, . . . . x,), z = (z,, . . . . z,), and cp is a quantifier-free formula over 
the vocabulary (R, S). Let atom be the set of atomic formulas and 
negations of atomic formulas in cp. 
DEFINITION 4.6. An (m, rp)-T-partial type t(u,, . . . . u,) is a maximal 
consistent subset of atom whose predicates are in T and whose variables 
are among ul, . . . . v,. 
DEFINITION 4.7. We say that condition (x’) holds for ‘Y if there are a 
(k, cp)-(R, S)-partial type t,(x) and a set P of (k + 1, cp)-(R, S)-partial types 
t(x, y) containing t, such that the following are true: 
1. There are (k + 1, cp)-(R, S)-partial types t,(x, y), ,.., t,Jx, y) in P 
such that the union lJf=, ti(x, y/x,) is consistent. 
2. Every (k + 1, cp)-R-partial type t(x, y) containing the restriction of 
t,,(x) to R is itself the restriction to R of some (k + 1, cp)-(R, S)-partial type 
in P. 
3. For each t(x, y) in P there is a (k + I+ 1, cp)-(R, S)-partial type 
t/(x, y, z) such that cp(x, y, z) is satisfied by t’, t is a subset of t’, and for 
each z,, 1 < i< I, the restriction of t’(x, zi/y) to atom is contained in a 
(k + 1, cp)-(R, S)-partial type in P. 
PROPOSITION 4.8. Let Y be a Et (Ackermann- ) sentence. Then condition 
(x) holds for Y if and only if condition (x’) holds for ‘I? 
Proof: Suppose first that condition (x) holds for Y with a k-(R, S)-type 
t,(x) and a set P of (k + 1)-(R, S)-types. Let tb be the restriction of t, to 
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atom(q). Let P’ be the set of all restrictions to atom(q) of the (k + I)- 
(R, S)-types in P. Since all the types in P extend t,, it follows that all 
partial types in P’ contain th. We claim that condition (x’) holds for t;, 
and P’. 
1. We know that there are (k + 1 )-(R, S)-types t,(x, y), . . . . t,(x, y) in 
P such that ti(x, y/xl) is identical with t,. Let t’,(x, y), . . . . t;(x, y) be the 
(k+ 1, cp)-(R, S)-partial types obtained from t,, . . . . t, by restriction to 
atom(q). Clearly, (J:=, ti(w, y/x,) is consistent. 
2. Let t(x, y) be a (k + 1, cp)-R-partial type containing the restriction 
of tb to R. Since (to- tb) n atom(q) = a, t is consistent5 with the restric- 
tion of t, to R. Thus, there is a (k + l)-R-type t’(x, y) that extends both t 
and the restriction of t, to R. By (x), t’ is the restriction to R of some 
(k+ 1)-(R, S)-type t” in P. Let t”(x, y) be the restriction of t’ to atom(q). 
By construction t” E P’. But t is the restriction to R of t”. Thus, t is the 
restriction to R of some partial type in P’. 
3. Let t(x, y) be a partial type in P’. Then t is contained in some type 
t’(x, y) in P. By (x), there is a (k + I+ 1 )-(R, S)-type t”(x, y, z) such that 
t’ G t”, t” satisfies q(x, 11, z), and for each zi, 1 d i 6 1, the (k + 1 )-(R, S)- 
type t”(x, zi/y) is in P. Let t”‘(x) y, z) be the (k+ I+ 1, cp)-(R, S)-partial 
type obtained by restricting t” to atom(q). Clearly, t G t”‘. Since the truth 
value of cp is determined by the truth assignment to the atomic formulas 
in atom(q), it follows that t”’ satisfies cp. Also, for each z,, 1 6 i < 1, the 
restriction of t”‘(x, z,/y) to atom(q) is contained in a (k + 1, cp)-(R, S)- 
partial type in P’. 
Suppose now that condition (x’) holds for Y with a (k, cp)-(R, S)-type 
t;(x) and a set P’ of (k+ 1, cp)-(R, S)-partial types. Let t’,(x, y), . . . . t;(x, y) 
be (k + 1, q)-(R, S)-partial types in P such that Uf=, t:(x, y/x,) is consis- 
tent. Let to(x) be some k-(R, S)-type extending uf=, t:(x, y/x,). Observe 
that t,, is consistent with all partial types t E P’, since (to - tb) n 
atom(q)= 12/. Let P be the set of all (k-t 1)-(R, S)-types t’(x, y) that 
extend t, u t for some t E P’. We claim that condition (x) holds with t, and 
P. 
1. Consider the (k + 1)-(R, S)-type t:(x, y). Since to contains 
t,!(x, y/x,), it follows that t;‘(x, I’) is consistent with tl(x, y). Therefore, 
qx, y) E P. 
2. Let t(x, y) be a (k + 1)-R-type extending the restriction of t, to R. 
Let t’(x, y) be the restriction of t to atom(q). Clearly, t’ contains the 
restriction of tb to R. By (x’), t’ is the restriction to R of some (k + 1, cp)- 
(R, S)-type t“ in P’. Clearly, t” is consistent with t,,. Let t”’ (x, y) be a 
5 Two types are consistent with each other if their union is consistent. 
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(k + 1)-(R, S)-type that extends t, u t”, By construction, t”’ E P and t is the 
restriction of t”’ to R. 
3. Let t(x, y) E P. Then there is t’(x, y) E P’, such that t extends 
rO u t’. By (x’), there is a (k + I+ 1, cp)-(R, S)-partial type t”(x, y, z) such 
that cp(x, y, z) is satisfied by t”, t’ is a subset of t”, and for each z,, 1 < id I, 
the restriction of t”(x, z,/y) to atom is contained in a (k + 1, q)-(R, S)- 
partial type ti(x, y) in P. Clearly, t is consistent with t” u lJf=, ti(x, y/z,). 
Let t”‘(x, JJ, z) be a (k + I+ I)-(R, S)-type extending t and t” u 
lJf= 1 1,(x, y/z,). Clearly, t”’ satisfies cp. Also, for each zi, 1 d i< I, we have 
that t”‘(x, z,/v) is in P, since it extends t, and t,. 
Since the number of (k + 1, cp)-(R, S)-partial types is exponential in the 
length of cp, it follows that condition (x’) can be checked in non-deter- 
ministic exponential time. Thus, the decision problem for the probabilities 
of Z: (Ackermann) sentences is in NEXPTIME. We can, however, do 
better. 
PROPOSITION 4.9. The decision problem for the probabilities of 2: 
(Ackermann -- ) sentences is in EXPTIME. 
Proof Let Y be an Ci (Ackermann ) sentence of the form 
~S(~x)(yYN~z) cp(X> y, z), 
where x = (xi, . . . . x,), z = (z,, . . . . z,), and cp is a quantifier-free formula over 
the vocabulary (R, S). We show that given a (k, cp)-(R, S)-partial type t,, 
we can determine in exponential time of there is a set P of (k + 1, cp)- 
(R, S)-partial types such that condition (x’) holds for t, and P. Thus, to 
check whether condition (x’) holds we have to cycle over all (k, cp)-(R, S)- 
partial types, of which there are exponentially many. 
Suppose now that t, is given. The crucial observation is that there is a 
unique maximal set P such that condition (x’ - 3) holds for to and P; for 
if condition (x’ - 3) holds both for t, and PI and for t, and P,, then clearly 
the condition holds also for t, and P, u P,. Thus, it suffices to search for 
this maximal unique set P and check in exponential time that t, and P 
satisfies conditions (x’ - 1) and (x’ - 2). P is constructed by the following 
algorithm : 
Initialize Q to be the set of all (k + 1, cp)-(R, S)-partial types 
until no change possible do 
if t(x, Y)E Q but there is no (k + I+ 1, cp)-(R, S)-partial type t’(x, y, z) 
such that cp is satisfied by t’, t is a subset of t’, and for each zi, 1 < i < 1, 
the restriction of t’(x, z,/y) to atom is contained in a (k + 1, cp)- 
(R, S)-partial type in Q, then eliminate t from Q. 
od 
&23/87!1/2-22 
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We claim that the final value of Q is the desired P. To prove this, we first 
show inductively that all the intermediate values of Q contains P. Initially 
this holds since Q is the set of all (k + 1, cp)-(R, S)-partial types, and at 
every subsequent iteration, if a partial type t is eliminated from Q, then it 
is easy to see that it cannot be a member of P. Finally, t, and the final 
value of Q satisfy condition (x’ - 2). This proves the claim. 
Since there are only exponentially many partial types, the algorithm 
must terminate after at most exponentially many iterations. Furthermore, 
if t(x, y) E Q, then we can test in nondeterministic polynomial time whether 
there is a (k + I+ 1, cp)-(R, S)-partial type t’(x, y, z) such that cp is satisfied 
by t’, t is a subset of t’, and for each zl, 1 6 i < 1, the restriction of t’(x, zJy) 
to atom is contained in a (k + 1, rp)-(R, S)-partial type in Q. Thus, the 
body of the loop can be implemented in exponential time. It follows that 
the algorithm has an exponential-time complexity. 1 
We now deal with the class .Z: (Ackermann). The important feature of 
the lack of equality is that a set s of atomic formulas and negation of 
atomic formulas is consistent iff for no atomic formula 0 we have that both 
8 E s and 10 E s. This is no longer the case in the presence of equality. 
Let Y be a ,Z’i (Ackermann) sentence of the form 
w3x)(vYmz) cp(XY , zh 
where x = (x,, . . . . xk), z = (z, , . . . . z,), and cp is a quantilier-free formula over 
the vocabulary (R, S). Let atom be the set of atomic formulas and 
negation of atomic formulas in cp ; this may include equalities and negation 
of equalities. 
As for the class C: (Ackermann ~ ) we are going to use partial types. The 
difference is that we allow equality formulas. This forces us to consider 
existential types in addition to partial types. 
DEFINITION 4.10. Let t(u, , . . . . u,) be a set of formulas in the variables 
vi, . . . . v,. Then we say that v, is existential in t with respect to u,,, . . . . vi,,, if 
vj is distinct from vj,, . . . . v,~., and t implies VT= , vJ = v,,. An (m, q)-T- 
existential type t(ui,, . . . . vi,) over the variables ui , . . . . u,, m < n, is a maximal 
consistent set of formulas in atom with predicates in T and variables 
among u,, . . . . u, such that if v occurs in t and u is distinct from u,], . . . . ui,, 
then u is existential in t with respect to ui,, . . . . u,,. Note that t can be also 
viewed as a partial type t(u,, . . . . v,). When we refer, however, to the existen- 
tial type t(ui,, . . . . vi,) we think of the existential variables as existentially 
quantified. That is, the existential type t(u,,, . . . . u,) can be viewed as the 
existential formula (3.4, . . . U, ~ ,) Aeo ( 8, where ui , . . . . u,-, are the existen- 
tial variables of t with respect to L;,~, .. . . v,,. 
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It is easy to see that every (m, cp)-T-existential type is implied by some 
m-T-type. A crucial observation is that the number of (k + 1, cp)-(R, S)- 
existential types is exponential in the length of Y. 
DEFINITION 4.11. Let t(x, y, z) be a (k+ I+ 1, rp)-(R, S)-partial type. 
Let zi,, . . . . z,~ be the variables that are existential in t with respect to 
xl, . . . . xk, y. Let t,(x, JJ) be the (k + 1, qo)-(R, S)-existential type over the 
variables xi , . . . . .xk) y, zi, , . . . . z,,. 
Note that t,(x, u) is different from t(x, y), as the latter is simply the 
restriction of t to the variables xi, . . . . xk, y. 
We are now ready to describe the alternative to condition (x). 
DEFINITION 4.12. We say that condition (x”) holds for Y if there are a 
k-(R, S)-type t,,(x) and a set P of (k+ 1, cp)-(R, S)-existential types t(x, y) 
over variables in the set {x,, . . . . xk, y, zl, . . . . z,} consistent with tO such that 
the following are true: 
1. For every i, 1 < i < k, the (k + l)-(R, S)-type tG’(x, y) implies some 
(k + 1, cp)-(R, S)-existential type t’(x, y) in P. 
2. If t(x, y) is a (k + I)-R-type containing the restriction of t,(x) to 
R, then there is a (k + 1, cp)-(R, S)-existential type t’(x, y) in P such that t 
implies the restriction of t’ to R. 
3. For each t(x, y) in P there is a (k + I+ 1, cp)-(R, S)-partial type 
t’(x, y, z) such that cp(x, y, z) is satisfied by t’, t is &(x, y), t’ is consistent 
with t,, and for each z,, 1 6 i < 1, we have that t’(x, y, z,, . ..) zi/u, . . . . z,) (i.e., 
t’ with zi renamed U) is consistent with t”(x, y/u) (i.e., t” with y renamed 
U) for some (k + 1, q)-(R, S)-existential type t”(x, y) in P, where u is a new 
variable. 
PROPOSITION 4.13. Let Y be a 2: (Ackermann) sentence. Then condition 
(x) holds for !P if and only if condition (x”) holds for Y. 
Proof: Suppose first that condition (x) holds for !P with a k-(R, S)-type 
t,,(x) and a set P of (k+ l)-(R, S)-types. Let P’ be the set of (k+ 1, cp)- 
(R, S)-existential types constructed as follows. Let t(x, y) be a (k + l)- 
(R, S)-type in P, and let t’(x, y, z) be the (k+ I+ 1)-(R, S)-type whose 
existence is guaranteed by (x - 2). Let t”(x, y, z) be the (k + I+ 1, cp)- 
(R, S)-partial type obtained by restricting t’ to atom(q). Then t;(x, y) is a 
(k + 1, cp)-(R, S)-existential type in P’. Since all the types in P contain t,, 
it follows that all existential types in P’ are consistent with t,. We claim 
that condition (x”) holds for t, and P’. 
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1. Let 1 < i< k. We know that t:(x, y) is in P. It follows that 
t:(x, y) implies some (k + 1, cp)-(R, S)-existential type in P’. 
2. Let t(x, y) be a (k+ 1)-R-type containing t,. By (x), t’ is the 
restriction to R of some (k + 1)-(R, S)-type t” in P. Let t”(x, y, z) be the 
(k + I+ l)-(R, S)-type whose existence is guaranteed by (x - 2). Let 
t”‘(x) y, z) be the (k + I + 1, cp)-(R, S)-partial type obtained by restricting t” 
to atom(q). Then t;‘(x, y) is a (k + 1, cp)-(R, S)-existential type in P’. 
Clearly, t implies the restriction of t;” to R. 
3. Let t”‘(x, y) be a (k + 1, cp)-(R, S)-existential type in P’. Then 
there is a (k + 1)-(R, S)-type t(x, y) in P, such that t”’ is ty(x, y), where 
t”(x, y, z) is the (k + I+ 1, cp)-(R, S)-partial type obtained by restricting to 
atom(q) the (k + 1+ 1 )-(R, S)-type t’(x, y, y) whose existence is guaranteed 
by (x - 2). It is easy to see that t” satisfies the desired conditions. 
Suppose now that condition (x”) holds for Iy with a k-(R, S)-type t,(x) 
and a set P’ of (k + 1, q)-(R, S)-existential types. Let P be the set of all 
(k + 1)-(R, S)-types t’(x, y) that contain t, and imply t for some t E P’ 
(recall that if t E P’, then t is consistent with t,). We claim that condition 
(1) holds with t, and P. 
1. Let 1 <id k. By assumption, the (k+ I)-(R, S)-type t;(x, y) 
implies some (k + 1, cp)-(R, S)-existential type t’(x, ,r) in P’. It follows that 
t;(x, y) is in P. 
2. Let t(x, y) be a (k+ 1)-R-type containing the restriction of t,,(x) 
to R. By (x”-2), there is a (k + 1, cp)-(R, S)-existential type t’(x, y)~ P 
such that t implies the restriction of t’ to R. Let t”(x, y) be a (k + I)-(R, S)- 
type containing t such that t” implies t’. By construction t” is in P and t 
is the restriction of t” to R. 
3. Let t(x, y) be a (k + 1)-(R, S)-type in P. Then there is a (k + 1, cp)- 
(R, S)-existential type t’(x, y) E P’, such that t contains t, and implies t’. By 
(x”- 3), there is a (k + I+ 1, cp)-(R, S)-partial type t”(x, y, z) such that 
cp(x, y, z) is satisfied by t”, t” is consistent with t,, t’ is t;(x, y), and for 
each zi, 1 d i 6 I, we have that t”(x, y, z,, . . . . 2,/u, . . . . 2,) is consistent with 
t;(x, y/u) for some (k + 1, cp)-(R, S)-existential type ti(x, y) in P, where u is 
a new variable. Without loss of generality we can assume that if t”(x, y, z) 
implies zi= y, then ti(x, y) is simply t’(x, y). Clearly, t is consistent with 
t”u uf=, ti(x, y/z,). Let t”‘(x, y, z) be a (k+l+ I)-(R, S)-type containing t 
and t” u uf= I ti(x, y/z,). Clearly, t”’ satisfies cp. Also, for each zi, 1 d i< I, 
we have that t”‘(x, z,/y) is in P, since it contains t, and t,. 1 
We can now give an upper bound for the lass Zi (Ackermann). 
PROPOSITION 4.14. The decision problem for the probabilities of Zt 
(Ackermann) sentences over an unbounded vocabulary is in Zyp. 
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ProoJ: Since the length of a k-(R, S)-type t,(x) and the number of 
(k + 1, cp)-(R, S)-existential types t(x, y) are both exponential in the length 
of rp, it follows that we can guess t, and the set P and check conditions 
(x” - 1) and (x” - 3) in exponential time. It remains to check condition 
(x” - 2). It is easy to see that the negation of this condition can be checked 
in nondeterministic exponential time; we just have to guess a (k + l)-R- 
type r(x, y) containing the restriction of t,(x) to R, such that for no 
(k+ 1, cp)-(R, S)-existential type t’(x, Y)E P we have that t implies the 
restriction of t’ to R. The claim follows. m 
PROPOSITION 4.15. The decision problem for the probabilities of L’: 
(Ackermann) sentences over a bounded vocabulary is in NEXPTIME. 
Proof We already observed that guess t, and P and checking (I” - 1) 
and (x” - 2) can be done in exponential type. If R is bounded, then the 
number of (k + 1)-R-types t(x, y) is exponential in the length of the given 
sentence. Thus, (x” - 3) can also be checked in exponential time. 1 
Remark 4.16. It follows from Proposition 4.15 and the proof of 
Proposition 4.4 that the satisfiability problem for first-order sentences of 
the Ackermann class is NEXPTIME-complete. While it was known that 
this problem is solvable (Dreben and Goldfarb, 1979) its complexity was 
unknown, since previous works have focused on the Ackermann class 
without equality (Furer, 1981; Lewis, 1980). 
5. NEGATIVE RESULTS 
We have mentioned in the introduction three solvable lirst-order prefix 
classes : the 3*V*-class, the 3*V3*-class, and the 3*VV3*-class without 
equality. The other minimal prefix classes are defined by the prefixes V*3, 
V33*, 3*V33, V3*V, 3*V3V, WEI*, and V3V* (cf. (Gurevich, 1969, 1976)). 
The decision problem for all these classes is unsolvable (Lewis, 1979). In 
this section we show that the O-1 law does not hold for the corresponding 
C: classes. 
PROPOSITION 5.1. The G-1 law does not hold for the class C:(V3V). 
ProoJ The following ,Z:(V3V)-sentence expresses parity (i.e., “there are 
an even number of elements”) by asserting that “there exists a permutation 
where every element is of order 2” : 
(~R)(VX)(~Y)(VZ)CR(X, Y) A (Nx, z) + y = z) 
A (R(x, z) - R(z, x)) A 1 R(x, x)]. 
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PROPOSITION 5.2. The &l law does not holdfor the class Zi(V33 without 
equality). 
Proof: Consider the following C:(V33)-sentence Y without equality 
over a vocabulary with a binary relation symbol E: 
(~~)(3~)(vx)(v~)(vz)oCR(x, WI * (Nx, Y) * Nx, z) + sty, z)) 
* (Nx, Y) t--) WY, x)) * lN4 xl 
* (SC& Y) + (ax, z) +-+ E(y, z)))l 
The above sentence “almost surely” expresses parity ; i.e., on almost all 
finite structures the sentence Y is true if the structure has an even number 
of elements and it is false if the structure has an odd number of elements. 
The reason for this is the almost all finite structures G = (V, E) satisfy the 
first-order sentence z 
b’x)WJy)(x Z Y 4 W)(E(x, z) * ~E(Y, ~1)). 
Thus, on almost all structures S is contained in the equality predicate and 
consequently Y expresses parity on such structures. 1 
We note that, unlike Proposition 5.2, Proposition 5.1 does assume the 
use of equality. It is an open question whether this use of equality can be 
eliminated. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The picture that emerges from the results here and in (Kolaitis and 
Verdi, 1987) for first-order logic with equality is that the classifications of 
prefix classes according to the solvability of the finite satisfiability problem 
and according to the O-1 law for the corresponding Cl fragment are identi- 
cal. Moreover, &l laws in this classification are always accompanied by 
solvability of the decision problem for the probabilities. This is supported 
by the positive results for the classes C: (Bernays-Schontinkel) and .Zl 
(Ackermann), and the negative results for the classes Cf(V3V) and Cf(V33). 
The last piece in the body of evidence was supplied recently by Pacholski 
and Szwast (1989), who showed that the O-1 law fails for the Z: (Godel) 
class with equality. 
The picture is less clear for first-order logic without equality, since the 
status of the classes 3*VV3, t/El*, V3*V, 3*VW, and V3V3* is still open. It 
may be tempting to hope that the classifications of prefix classes according 
to the solvability of the finite satisfiability problem and according to the 
O-1 law for the corresponding C: fragment are identical also for first-order 
logic without equality. When attempting, however, to show that the O-1 
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law holds for the class Z: (Giidel) without equality, by extending the proof 
of the C&l law for the .Z’: (Ackermann) class in Section 3, we encountered 
difficulties similar to those encountered in trying to extend G6del’s 
solvability proof of the satisfiability problem (Giidel, 1932) for the Giidel 
class without equality to the satisfiability problem for the GGdel class with 
equality (cf. (Goldfarb, 1986; Gurevich and Shelah, 1983)). This suggests 
that the O-1 law may not hold for the class Zi (Gijdel) without equality, 
even though the finite satisfiability problem for the GCdel class without 
equality is solvable. 
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